Maximin in Iraq

A conversation I had with Trish over at Belmont Club, which I thought worth saving here:

I said:
Many fault Bush for placing his bet on the long shot, on the optimal: Iraqi Democracy in the Middle East.

Of course, nobody disputes that it is, and was, best case scenario. Even Bush admits as much. ("Beginning of the end vs. end of the beginning.")

But take a closer look at the latter part -- "end of the beginning." What could that possibly mean?

Maximin, through divide and refocus (a hint: in this outcome, it's not us who becomes refocused). Never forget: a loss in Iraq means red on red. That's why the move was so smart.

Trish said:
If red on red had been our objective, that'd be one thing. We'd be achieving our objective. We'd be perceived as winning. Big.

It wasn't our objective. It wasn't anywhere in our grand declarations.

I said:
trish,

I do feel that perception is a fundamental element for which we must account, as you know. And as you stated, grand U.S. declarations alter them negatively when they don't pan out. That is a fact.

So in a sense, I'm with you. It is true that we did not declare our objective to be the introversion of Middle Eastern Islam, nor did we discuss the utility of Operation Iraqi Freedom as being the key to unleashing the ancient tensions between the Sunni and Shia. I cannot even be sure it was discussed in the highest offices. They may not have known.

But it's true nonetheless. Now, it may be a case of God watching over children, drunks, and the United States of America, but by removing the impediment of Saddam Hussein, we released that centuries-old demon that haunts Islam to this day -- the hatred that only perceived hereticism can create.

The tensions that play out in Iraq are but a microcosm of the tensions that play out in Islamdom as a whole. Sure, one might argue that by removing her enemy we allowed an ascendant Iran, just like by removing Saddam we allowed an ascendant Shia south. But an ascendant Iran leads to a paranoid Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, etc. And while they are worrying about each other, scheming against each other, attacking and killing each other -- well, while they are doing that they won't be killing Americans. And that is what we're after.

Other perceptions are at play here besides those that judge American success or failure, and these perceptions might be the dispositive ones. How many Americans currently retain any sympathy for Muslims in general, and Arabs in particular? Not many, I would imagine. How many young men in Iraq are signing up to go to New York? Few, because their problems are more immediate, and more primal, than they were five years ago.

To be defeated in a noble effort because the metal of the Iraqis was discovered to be unmalleable is not that hard for Americans to digest, though Bush will be the scape-goat for it. The fault, it would have turned out, lies not in ourselves but in the stars. Our intentions were pure, it was the Iraqis who were flawed.

In 1946 our government identified a non-pc approach to dealing with an Islamic global threat: stroke the fault-lines within the religion, and their attention will be diverted. In-fighting will consume them, and we will be spared the worst of their lashings. That has stuck with me since I read it.

If we fail in Iraq, we will have falsified the advice of 2002. But it is also true that we would have carried out the advice of a more lucid time.

Bush's hope was for Americans to win, Iraqis to win, and Muslims to win. That is a decent, noble goal.

But Americans-win, Iraqis-lose, and Muslims-lose is not all that bad either.