Looking Busy: Our Likely Strategy Going Forward
You'll notice the Israelis are asking for Nato (see 2164th 8:32). Bolton was asked about Nato deployment in Lebanon by Wolf Blitzer just a day or two ago, and he deflected the question completely. As far as I know, the Administration has refused to comment on this issue officially.
So the Israelis are talking about Nato deployment, while the Americans demur. I think I see a pattern.
When Stalin was fishing for a deal with Hitler, Stalin manipulated his way into making sure it was formulated in German. There was a danger that it might fall into the wrong hands, and Russia stood to lose if Great Britain and France disovered it. Stalin wanted to keep the negotiations secret just in case they didn't pan out, because just a few weeks before he had drafted a deal with the two Allies to guard against German aggression from the West. They had agreed to come to Stalin's aid should Hitler decide to strike. To keep this option as a safety net, Stalin wanted, at a minimum, for any discovered negotiations to have the appearance they were put forward by Germany. That way, should the papers be purloined, Stalin could just shrug them off and declare them irrelevant. The lesson: sometimes the order and directionality of diplomatic events can be manipulated to improve one's strategic position.
I think it matters that Israel is suggesting Nato, while America stays quiet. Israel needs to be seen as giving a damn about a ceasefire, and America, which wants to avoid losing any more prestige, doesn't want to commit to a diplomatic solution until she can be sure it will succeed. Israel's angle is to play up Nato as an exceptional out, Washinton's right now is to take the time to "marshall world opinion." Because the demand that Hezbollah declare defeat first will have diminishing marginal returns, Washington will need a plan to transition to, and it looks like Nato will be the standby, the fix that is agreeable to all parties (the Lebanonese Government has already stipulated acceptance to a multi-national deployment).
So Israel brings up an acceptable out; America thinks on it, then advocates it; the International Community commits; and in the meantime Israel destroys Hezbollah. That is what I think will happen.
Here is a like to the Nato Decision-Making Procedure:
Within the U.S. government and in allied governments, there is varied support for preserving decision-making by consensus. Most senior U.S. officials associated with NATO affairs contend that they support the principle of consensus, although some acknowledge that forging consensus in an era when NATO may go out-of-area is likely to be difficult.
Nato, as an international institution, is governed by procedural rules, rules we can use to our advantage. While there are perhaps many that I am not aware of, the salient point is that within Nato it can take some time to build a consensus for troop deployment, especially if two or three other countries are in on it. Working with our allies, we can register reasonable and believable concerns at the Nato roundtable to draw out the negotiations as far as possible. We can ensure a saturated agenda, and play for time, thereby allowing Israel to use her overmatch to destroy Hezbollah.
For instance, the question of who will contribute troops could be a stalling point. We can express reservation about deploying American soldiers, thanks to all the articles that said our forces are overstretched in Iraq. We can say, "I'm sorry, fellas, we just can't swing it." This will force the other, more zealous members to put their money where their mouth is and cough up some of their own troops. That right there could add weeks to a Nato deployment.
The same is true, of course, with the UN, from which the Administration has hinted it desires an endorsement of Nato action. This will take up even more time, and might actually fail because Russia is against Nato mission enlargement. Nato mission enlargement has a high strategic value for us, and both Bush and Putin know it. (We know Bush knows because we have access to his overall strategy, and we know Putin knows because his government has spoken against it).
So here's what I think will happen:
Israel will continue to advocate a Nato deployment on Lebanon's southern border as an acceptable alternative to the present course. We will continue our fact-finding and consensus building, which Kissinger refers to as a "well-known diplomatic acquiescence to the status-quo." When we can no longer extend this war that way, when the pressure from the international community becomes a legitimate concern, then the US can bow to the pressure and begin to talk about talking about Nato. This will happen in the next few days, I think. I also think that once the Administration starts talking about it, the transition to full blown Nato deliberation will be short -- short because the US will once again have taken the spotlight, and while there she must faithfully play her part of earnest fireman. Of course, shortly after the US starts talks with Nato, we will move into the "thrown-negotiations" phase, which will last weeks or maybe even months (it's fitting that we should destroy Iran's proxy using the same diplomatic stall-strategy they are using to acquire nukes).
We gain quite a bit by this move, and so do the Israelis. The longer this conflict lasts, the more pressure can be put on Assad and Iran. So long as the uncertainty reigns about Israel's intentions -- a confusion well documented in the blogosphere -- and so long as the situation remains fluid, the stress on these regimes can continue to rise. With Syria, perhaps even to the breaking point.
Israel gets to dismantle Hezbollah, just like we did the Taliban; furthermore, once she is satisfied, Israel can transfer responsibility for occupation to the international community. By doing this, Israel will have advanced her interests: politically, she should avoid much negative feedback in the international arena by being seen to have given in to authority; strategically, because "collective security" is strengthened when it is perceived to have succeeded -- an aura Israel can bestow up it by agreeing to a ceasefire (Israel has made it clear that she would rather "collective security" take care of Iran).
If Syria doesn't fall and Israel doesn't strike her before the conflict is over, Iran becomes Okinawa, the hope being that with the center of gravity in Iran neutralized, Syria will drift away from intransigence. For Bush to end Iran's nuclear program and maintain the aura of legitimacy -- which, per Kissinger, is one of our strategic objectives -- he will need to do what his father did and internationalize the problem. However, unlike his father who could only use the UN (Nato in 1991 had yet to act out of area), Bush II can choose between two international organizations to solve this problem-- each of them able to confer legitimacy on our pursuit of US interests (a market approach to foreign policy in the making?), and each of them stuffed with procedural hurdles.
As an aside, many wonder about the utility of institutions like the UN. I think the answer is clear.
In an age of instant communication, time and reality are distorted, causing all kinds of new pressures on international crises management. Institutions with rules, procedures and committees combat this distortion, and tend to cleave the decision cycle away from the frenetic 24/7 news cycle, allowing for a longer time to deliberate on events. Sometimes this is unfortunate because we are in a race against time, like we are with Darfur and Iran. Sometimes, however, we need to draw things out, like we do now.
And there's just no better way to draw things out than bureaucracy.
So the Israelis are talking about Nato deployment, while the Americans demur. I think I see a pattern.
When Stalin was fishing for a deal with Hitler, Stalin manipulated his way into making sure it was formulated in German. There was a danger that it might fall into the wrong hands, and Russia stood to lose if Great Britain and France disovered it. Stalin wanted to keep the negotiations secret just in case they didn't pan out, because just a few weeks before he had drafted a deal with the two Allies to guard against German aggression from the West. They had agreed to come to Stalin's aid should Hitler decide to strike. To keep this option as a safety net, Stalin wanted, at a minimum, for any discovered negotiations to have the appearance they were put forward by Germany. That way, should the papers be purloined, Stalin could just shrug them off and declare them irrelevant. The lesson: sometimes the order and directionality of diplomatic events can be manipulated to improve one's strategic position.
I think it matters that Israel is suggesting Nato, while America stays quiet. Israel needs to be seen as giving a damn about a ceasefire, and America, which wants to avoid losing any more prestige, doesn't want to commit to a diplomatic solution until she can be sure it will succeed. Israel's angle is to play up Nato as an exceptional out, Washinton's right now is to take the time to "marshall world opinion." Because the demand that Hezbollah declare defeat first will have diminishing marginal returns, Washington will need a plan to transition to, and it looks like Nato will be the standby, the fix that is agreeable to all parties (the Lebanonese Government has already stipulated acceptance to a multi-national deployment).
So Israel brings up an acceptable out; America thinks on it, then advocates it; the International Community commits; and in the meantime Israel destroys Hezbollah. That is what I think will happen.
Here is a like to the Nato Decision-Making Procedure:
Within the U.S. government and in allied governments, there is varied support for preserving decision-making by consensus. Most senior U.S. officials associated with NATO affairs contend that they support the principle of consensus, although some acknowledge that forging consensus in an era when NATO may go out-of-area is likely to be difficult.
Nato, as an international institution, is governed by procedural rules, rules we can use to our advantage. While there are perhaps many that I am not aware of, the salient point is that within Nato it can take some time to build a consensus for troop deployment, especially if two or three other countries are in on it. Working with our allies, we can register reasonable and believable concerns at the Nato roundtable to draw out the negotiations as far as possible. We can ensure a saturated agenda, and play for time, thereby allowing Israel to use her overmatch to destroy Hezbollah.
For instance, the question of who will contribute troops could be a stalling point. We can express reservation about deploying American soldiers, thanks to all the articles that said our forces are overstretched in Iraq. We can say, "I'm sorry, fellas, we just can't swing it." This will force the other, more zealous members to put their money where their mouth is and cough up some of their own troops. That right there could add weeks to a Nato deployment.
The same is true, of course, with the UN, from which the Administration has hinted it desires an endorsement of Nato action. This will take up even more time, and might actually fail because Russia is against Nato mission enlargement. Nato mission enlargement has a high strategic value for us, and both Bush and Putin know it. (We know Bush knows because we have access to his overall strategy, and we know Putin knows because his government has spoken against it).
So here's what I think will happen:
Israel will continue to advocate a Nato deployment on Lebanon's southern border as an acceptable alternative to the present course. We will continue our fact-finding and consensus building, which Kissinger refers to as a "well-known diplomatic acquiescence to the status-quo." When we can no longer extend this war that way, when the pressure from the international community becomes a legitimate concern, then the US can bow to the pressure and begin to talk about talking about Nato. This will happen in the next few days, I think. I also think that once the Administration starts talking about it, the transition to full blown Nato deliberation will be short -- short because the US will once again have taken the spotlight, and while there she must faithfully play her part of earnest fireman. Of course, shortly after the US starts talks with Nato, we will move into the "thrown-negotiations" phase, which will last weeks or maybe even months (it's fitting that we should destroy Iran's proxy using the same diplomatic stall-strategy they are using to acquire nukes).
We gain quite a bit by this move, and so do the Israelis. The longer this conflict lasts, the more pressure can be put on Assad and Iran. So long as the uncertainty reigns about Israel's intentions -- a confusion well documented in the blogosphere -- and so long as the situation remains fluid, the stress on these regimes can continue to rise. With Syria, perhaps even to the breaking point.
Israel gets to dismantle Hezbollah, just like we did the Taliban; furthermore, once she is satisfied, Israel can transfer responsibility for occupation to the international community. By doing this, Israel will have advanced her interests: politically, she should avoid much negative feedback in the international arena by being seen to have given in to authority; strategically, because "collective security" is strengthened when it is perceived to have succeeded -- an aura Israel can bestow up it by agreeing to a ceasefire (Israel has made it clear that she would rather "collective security" take care of Iran).
If Syria doesn't fall and Israel doesn't strike her before the conflict is over, Iran becomes Okinawa, the hope being that with the center of gravity in Iran neutralized, Syria will drift away from intransigence. For Bush to end Iran's nuclear program and maintain the aura of legitimacy -- which, per Kissinger, is one of our strategic objectives -- he will need to do what his father did and internationalize the problem. However, unlike his father who could only use the UN (Nato in 1991 had yet to act out of area), Bush II can choose between two international organizations to solve this problem-- each of them able to confer legitimacy on our pursuit of US interests (a market approach to foreign policy in the making?), and each of them stuffed with procedural hurdles.
As an aside, many wonder about the utility of institutions like the UN. I think the answer is clear.
In an age of instant communication, time and reality are distorted, causing all kinds of new pressures on international crises management. Institutions with rules, procedures and committees combat this distortion, and tend to cleave the decision cycle away from the frenetic 24/7 news cycle, allowing for a longer time to deliberate on events. Sometimes this is unfortunate because we are in a race against time, like we are with Darfur and Iran. Sometimes, however, we need to draw things out, like we do now.
And there's just no better way to draw things out than bureaucracy.
posted by John Aristides at 7/24/2006 03:10:00 AM
1 Comments:
Linked this to my blog just today.
You're right on the mark. I've always suggested that two can play at this "diplomacy" game. Wait, three: the so-called international community, the apologetic terrorists and now, Israel.
Still wondering why people aren't commenting on your post!
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