To Not Accept

You know, I was reading Kissinger's Diplomacy today, and came to the part where he discussed Roosevelt's pledge that America "would not accept a Hilter-dominated world."

Kissinger writes:

"The phrase 'will not accept' had to mean that Roosevelt was in effect committing America to go to war for the Four Freedoms if they could not be achieved in any other way."

Kissinger thinks Roosevelt would have eventually mobilized for war even without the casus belli supplied by Japan and then later by Germany. He acknowledges that he might be wrong, but the argument he puts forth to support his position is very persuasive (and note, Kissinger's conclusion might be more important than reality here).

The reason I am leaning so heavily on a single paragraph in a single book should be obvious. The people in the Administration derived their knowledge from somewhere; they weren't born knowing how to conduct diplomacy. They were taught or self-taught, by a mentor, by books, or by both.

For an amateur like me, it is fortunate that the number of possible books and mentors available to our high officials is finite, and easily traceable (curricula are easy to discover, as are ideological lineages and cross-pollinations). Immersing oneself in this literature only takes time and a university library card.

It's an inexact science, though, and most of the things our officials do and say are so context-specific that any prediction about intent is nothing more than an educated guess. However, some things stand out, and some patterns are clear.

The question of Iranian nukes is the question of this Administration's second term. It has had and continues to have hundreds of the brightest minds working the problem, and a Kissingerian in Rice revising and transmitting advice to the President. Statements that are made about the issue are likely some of the most closely vetted. For the Administration to have repeatedly used the exact language that Roosevelt used, language that is sure to have rung bells for the realists in Bush's Administration, is almost a deal closer for me -- as in Q.E.D. The President has made his decision that Iran will not have nuclear weapons, and that's that.

Now, the obvious alternative to this theory is that Bush simply doesn't know, and wasn't told, that such wording has a specific history in American diplomacy, and therefore has a specific meaning and specific negotiational "value" once it has been used. According to this theory, Bush said it because he felt it, blurted it out in the glare of the moment and did not do his studying. The problem with this is that the exact same wording has now been used by multiple officials on numerous occasions (Bolton here, here, and here; Rice here and here; and even Chirac, here.) and has been repeated verbatim by Bush when asked to clarify (here, here, here, and here -- where Bush says his biggest fear is for Iran to acquire nukes).

It's exactly the kind of esoteric language that Diplomats rely on to communicate with each other discreetly -- a professional language built on history and experience (which is why Clinton's apology tour caused alarm for our allies because they were afraid we had become unreliable -- i.e. it was unprecedented). Like the lexicon of law, diplomatic phraseology derives subtly, from precedent. Therefore, when speaking diplomatically, using phrases like "unacceptable" and "we will not allow" -- which Bush as done repeatedly -- clarifies intent, for allies and foes alike.

Bob Kagan put forward this theory a few weeks ago here. Excerpt:

Let's imagine, and this is purely hypothetical, that President Bush has already decided that he will not leave office in January 2009 without a satisfactory resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem. Let's imagine that he has already determined that if he cannot obtain Iran's agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons program voluntarily and verifiably, then he will order some form of military action to destroy as much of that program as possible before he leaves. Let's imagine that he has resolved not to end his two terms in office the way Bill Clinton ended his, by leaving every major international crisis -- from Iraq to Iran to North Korea to al-Qaeda -- for his successor.

Let's say, just for the sake of argument, that Bush had made such a decision. What would he be doing right now? The answer is that he might be doing exactly what he is doing.

When I read Kagan's piece, it sounded right. Thereafter, I started looking for probative evidence that could either prove or disprove his theory. I think I've found it.

I could be wrong. I hope I'm not.