Notes on Analytical Framework for 21st Century Strategy, Terrorist Networks

The generation of a terrorist is a series of identity acquisitions or subsumations into a network. As a stem cell assumes the identity of the network it is thrown into, so does a human being, to a large extent. Therefore, the Muslimness is acquired by connectivity, and the acquisition of this connection follows the laws set out above. One will become Muslim if the network one finds oneself in is dominated by Muslim hubs. The strength of the connection is the amount of behavior this identity informs. A strong connection would govern a lot of behavior. A weak connection very little.

So we have two big problems here. One is that Muslim hubs (Mosques and Imams) outside of Muslim territory are largely Wahhabi, a type of Islam that creates strong identities of Muslimness. Two, we live in a super-network where one of the parameters is a bar on laws proscribing the free practice of religion, and, accordingly, the free generation of religious identities. Insofar as a strong connection to the overall Muslim network facilitates the transmission of harmful ideas, and insofar as harmful ideas proliferate within the network by retaining the claim to Muslimness (as Wahhabism does), then Wahhabi Mosques will continue to resupply the actual network of Islamic terrorism with low-'k', high clustering coefficient soldiers. Evil men will be able to co-opt these channels to transmit their evil intent to impressionable young men. Muslim extremism will exist so long as this dynamic exists.

Of course, intent must be married to capability before this turns into a huge problem. And capability implies other networks.

A terrorist cell, acting independently, can accomplish only so much. If it tries to reach out and connect to a hub, it risks being discovered. If it tries to act independently, it risks failure. If it tries to grow too much, it risks being noticed.