Alloyed, and Annealed

Rice is working on a ceasefire. Bush says it is a "moment of opportunity and a chance for a broader change in the region." Yet everybody seems to think a ceasefire would be an unmitigated disaster for Israel.

But maybe we're thinking about this all wrong. What if there is some variable that we are undervaluing strategically, an option that has positive consequences that increase over time, instead of the diminishing marginal returns that would undoubtedly accrue to a "total Israeli victory".

I've been thinking about that Eric Hoffer quote:

The assertion that a mass movement cannot be stopped by force is not literally true. Force can stop and crush even the most vigorous movement. But to do so the force must be ruthless and persistent. And here is where faith enters as an indispensable factor. For a persecution that is ruthless and persistent can come only from fanatical conviction. Any violence which does not spring from a firm, spiritual base, will be wavering and uncertain. It lacks the stability which can only rest in a fanatical outlook.

If Israel goes all the way, dismantling Hezbollah and driving it from the south, she will have to go to extraordinary and far-reaching lengths. If this happens, Lebanon will be deeply traumatized, instead of just shocked as she is now. Worse, it will be trauma unalloyed by triumph -- just defeat, indignity, and humiliation festering in the popular mind.

But strife is sure to follow, when the Gods of Vengeance rule. What we would get is a generation of grievance for the Lebanese people, a radicalization of Arab politics, and a few years of an unsteady peace, followed, most likely, by another regional calamity. Islamists would gain a propaganda victory that would drown out the regional voices of moderation and progress.

If Israel decides to completely destroy Hezbollah with fanatical violence, she will have bowed to the pessimism of fatalism -- the fatalism of the oft cited but rarely understood cycle of violence. It is not where we want to go, if we have a choice.

But what if we do have a choice, a better choice? What if instead of pessimism we tried to formulate an option based on optimism? What would it look like?

Would it not involve the Lebanese government, which I previously referred to as the prize in this conflict for both sides (and what Wretchard calls the center of gravity)? Would it not involve legitimizing the democratic pluralists and delegitimizing the Hezbollah?

Well, that's the plan.

Basically, we have to make this fight end in a victory for the Lebanese government, and in a defeat for the Hezbollah. The Lebanese need to feel saved by the democrats, and betrayed by the Islamists. As Rice says, "The most important thing that this does for the process is that it shows a Lebanese government that is functioning as a Lebanese government. That is in and of itself extremely important."

We need to create an environment where the Siniora government can say to its people, "See, we can protect you this way, by using civilized methods, while the primitive ways of Hezbollah only bring death and destruction." That is a powerful message for a newly victorious government, especially if it can be shown to exercise influence in the diplomatic arena. The only thing that could erode its prestige would be if the Government was unable to deliver the goods afterwards.

But what if we made sure it could deliver on its promises of a better future? You see, I read about Saudi Arabia sending $500 million in humanitarian aid to Lebanon, and pledging an additional $1 billion in reconstruction aid. I realized they would in no way do that if they thought they would be funding the ascendancy of Hezbollah in the politics of the Middle East. Even more intriguing, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt have also already pledged a large amount of Money. And then it hit me. Iraq. Jordan. Egypt. Saudi Arabia.

They are all enemies of Iran, and therefore enemies of Hezbollah. How likely is it they would be out of the gates this fast with pledged money -- and at that amount! -- if it were possible that Hezbollah or Syria would be the beneficiaries. Then it dawned on me that it was even less likely that these countries would feel compelled to condemn Hezbollah by their fear of Iranian hegemony, which is the popular wisdom, and yet unmoved by the prospect of funding its surrogate. And if they weren't compelled to do this, how likely is it that moral clarity can account for these regimes and their decision to risk heightened domestic unrest by condemning Hezbollah and not Israel in the initial stages of this conflict. So what could account for this strange brew of facts?

Think about what everybody wants. US wants regional progress on the human condition to lay the foundation for a stable and enduring peace. Israel wants a stable and secure neighbor that does not threaten her with war, and an end to the militancy of Hezbollah. Lebanon wants stability and prosperity for her people, and a once and for all end to the trauma of conflict. France wants to be seen as a great and influential power. Britain wants to solve the Israel-Palestine problem. Saudi Arabia wants an Israeli ceasefire, the support of America, less pressure domestically, and a contained and receding Iran. Jordan and Egypt want the same. Iraq wants stability, a cessation of Syrian and Iranian meddling in its internal affairs, and American help and largess to see it through these troubled times.

If Israel pursues its military solution, nobody gets what they want -- even if Hezbollah is virtually destroyed. Israel cannot get what it wants militarily. But if Siniora's government and the international community foil Israel's perfidious plans, stop the fighting and send her home; if an international force augments and extends Lebanon's control over all of its territory; if calm resumes and rebuilding starts; and if the Lebanese government can acquire a monopoly of violence -- if all that happens, everybody wins, even -- and especially -- Israel.

Something Michael Totten said the other day has been floating in the back of my mind:

[Lebanon] needed several more years of careful nurturing during peace time to fully recover from its status as a carved up failed state.

By bombing all of Lebanon rather than merely the concentrated Hezbollah strongholds, Israel is putting extraordinary pressure on Lebanese society at points of extreme vulnerability. The delicate post-war democratic culture has been brutally replaced, overnight, with a culture of rage and terror and war. Lebanon isn't Gaza, but nor is it Denmark.

Lebanese are temporarily more united than ever. No one is running off to join Hezbollah, but tensions are being smoothed over for now while everyone feels they are under attack by the same enemy. Most Lebanese who had warm feelings for Israel -- and there were more of these than you can possibly imagine -- no longer do.

This will not last.

My sources and friends in Beirut tell me most Lebanese are going easy on Hezbollah as much as they can while the bombs are still falling. But a terrible reckoning awaits them once this is over.

The problem, though, is that Hezbollah is the most powerful force in the country, with much more firepower than the Lebanese Army. The reckoning would inevitably devolve into civil war, unless some kind of support was installed from the outside to mitigate Hezbollah's advantages in power and maximize their disadvantage in politics. And that's where the international force comes in.

Kissinger once lamented the American practice of separating diplomacy from war, and war from diplomacy, so that ne'er the twain should meet. By doing this, he argues, we lose many strategic openings during the course of diplomacy--by not using a calibrated and increasing force to apply pressure on our enemies--and during hostilities, by not striking deals when our enemies are at the point of least advantage. We treat war and diplomacy as opposites, so that when one is on the other is off. It's either total war, or total diplomacy. We forget that they can be intertwined, and in our ignorance we preclude many opportunities for strategic gain.

Hezbollah is now calling for a ceasefire. They are at the point of maximum disadvantage. If we could use our leverage -- which will increase over the next week or two, plateau, then sharply decrease as hostilities extend -- to cram an international blocking force down Hezbollah's throat, then we may be able to provide that support that is so desperately needed for Lebanon's democratic culture to mature. At the end of the day, Hezbollah would be degraded by violence, isolated by politics, and quarantined by force. And only in this context can Lebanon's democratic culture thrive.

France could supply the troops and be consequential again. [Update: That's what's happening.] America would increase her status as a peace broker, and at the same time lay the foundations for an enduring peace by supporting a democracy and forestalling a propaganda victory for Islamists. Blair would win domestically by stopping the violence, and Britain would be one step closer to solving the problem of the Levant. Siniora's government would win by carrying the honor of its people -- it would be the David who drove back the Israeli Goliath -- and by delivering stability and prosperity afterwards. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq would all get what they want, too: a politically and militarily quarantined Hezbollah, and an isolated and receding Iran, all while maintaining street cred with their people by demanding an end to the violence. It would be a major victory in the war on terror.

Lebanon needs to alloy its trauma with triumph and relief, and the democratic Lebanese government needs to be annealed.

It would be a brilliant move, if we could pull it off.

Update: Brent Scowcroft agrees. Excerpt:

The benefits of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the root cause of today's turmoil would likely ripple well beyond the Israelis and the Palestinians. A comprehensive peace settlement would not only defang the radicals in Lebanon and Palestine (and their supporters in other countries), it would also reduce the influence of Iran -- the country that, under its current ideology, poses the greatest potential threat to stability in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan [emphasis mine].

A comprehensive settlement also would allow Arab leaders to focus on what most say is a primary concern: modernizing their countries to provide jobs and productive lives for their rapidly growing populations.

Bush and Blair wanted to use this opportunity to address "root causes". It could work. Look for Israel to expand operations in the next few days, then agree to a ceasefire and international force without demanding a full disarmament of Hezbollah.

Everybody will get a long-term strategic victory, except the Hez, even though they will claim one.

The idea of nation-building was not necessarily falsified by Iraq. What was falsified was the idea of nation-building in the midst of a brutal and wanton insurgency supported by recalcitrant and meddling neighbors. If we create an environment where an extended insurgency is precluded by circumstance, nation-building should work. Therefore, we should have Hezbollah agree to a ceasefire, insert an international force to quarantine them, and then have the democratic government of Lebanon get all the credit. That might just do it.