The Unremarkable Strategy--Literally
I have been unsuccessful at finding any other strategist or pundit, from MSM on down, who has analyzed our current diplomatic strategy in light of our coming confrontation with Iran. This unsuccess has been surprising.
So here are some questions to consider:
1. Is Iran the center of gravity for our current diplomatic strategy? If it is, then why not consider the US/Israeli acquiescence to a ceasefire a warping effect? As any mathematical theorist can explain, around any large mass, straight lines become curved. Accordingly, if we removed the large mass that is Iran's nuclear program, much of what others complain about makes sense: it is logical to take this time to destroy Hezbollah. However, in a world where all strategies curve back towards Iran, perhaps these comments miss the mark?
2. Would you at least entertain the notion that to mount a serious diplomatic confrontation with Iran, for both domestic and international reasons, the war in Lebanon has to be over?
3. Is not Iran's nuclear program, and not Hezbollah, the bigger threat -- one that is time sensitive to boot?
4. If we are anticipating a diplomatic showdown with Iran, followed perhaps by a punitive military strike on its nuclear sites, would it make sense to stand on principle over Hezbollah and risk our chances of international consensus over Iran? Should we blow our diplomatic wad over a fistful of katyushas, or should we save it for the big dance? Might this not explain our solicitousness of France and her view of ceasefire?
The overriding point is that we need to clear the tracks of all minor traffic so the Big Train can get underway. I think the Administration is getting pretty anxious to begin, and that is why the backtracking on the ceasefire. The only other way this diplomacy makes sense is if you seriously think Bush has given up.
Is Bush that weak, to give in so quickly on his hopes of a lasting peace? Or is he, like Ahab, that single-minded, with a fixed and firm, forward dedication in his glance? Those are the only options I can see. Any comments?
So here are some questions to consider:
1. Is Iran the center of gravity for our current diplomatic strategy? If it is, then why not consider the US/Israeli acquiescence to a ceasefire a warping effect? As any mathematical theorist can explain, around any large mass, straight lines become curved. Accordingly, if we removed the large mass that is Iran's nuclear program, much of what others complain about makes sense: it is logical to take this time to destroy Hezbollah. However, in a world where all strategies curve back towards Iran, perhaps these comments miss the mark?
2. Would you at least entertain the notion that to mount a serious diplomatic confrontation with Iran, for both domestic and international reasons, the war in Lebanon has to be over?
3. Is not Iran's nuclear program, and not Hezbollah, the bigger threat -- one that is time sensitive to boot?
4. If we are anticipating a diplomatic showdown with Iran, followed perhaps by a punitive military strike on its nuclear sites, would it make sense to stand on principle over Hezbollah and risk our chances of international consensus over Iran? Should we blow our diplomatic wad over a fistful of katyushas, or should we save it for the big dance? Might this not explain our solicitousness of France and her view of ceasefire?
The overriding point is that we need to clear the tracks of all minor traffic so the Big Train can get underway. I think the Administration is getting pretty anxious to begin, and that is why the backtracking on the ceasefire. The only other way this diplomacy makes sense is if you seriously think Bush has given up.
Is Bush that weak, to give in so quickly on his hopes of a lasting peace? Or is he, like Ahab, that single-minded, with a fixed and firm, forward dedication in his glance? Those are the only options I can see. Any comments?
6 Comments:
Orlandoslug,
I think there is a strategic tension here. The long game, as you mention, will only be won by expanding the tent and discrediting the Destructors.
The short game is economic and geopolitical in nature, and in that game an Iran with nuclear weapons is a significant risk and setback, as would be the inevitable rise in nuclear proliferation afterwards.
Which strategy wins the day? The one focusing on intent, or the one worried about capability?
I have been making points 1 and 3 ever since my piece:
Tactics, Strategy, Grand Strategy
also referenced at WoC.
I do not think #2 will do any good at this point. Too late for that.
Iran needed to be dealt with once they started making mischief in Iraq. That would have been 2004.
The J Post said as a minor point in an article (sorry no link)that Bush suggested that Israel go to war with Syria. Olmert turned him down. Now the fat is really in the fire.
I think Olmert thinks like a civilian. He can't stand casualties. Now he may be responsible for hundreds of thousands.
I think Israel will need to take a nuke.
Then Iran will get it.
There will be a lot of crying.
By not going after Iran sooner (popular will or no) Bush has screwed the pooch.
He was acting like he had time. A bad way to behave with nuclear war on the table.
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Gentlemen. You are making one critical mistake. Iran is not crazy. They are acting on a different belief system.
Think the Austrian Corporal. He may have had some crazy ideas and been prone to screaming fits, but he had a rational plan. Execution was poor. The plan had probaly a better than 50% chance of suceeding.
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Short outline: world wide chaos and the destruction of Israel will lead to the coming of the 12th imam.
So what is the battle plan?
If those guys have nukes it is not to scare us (they may save a few for that). It is to wipe Israel off the map.
Is any one paying attention?
If we accept that Iran is the "center of gravity", then - why react with such initial ferocity to Hizbullah?
The Hizbullah rockets were always seen as a deterrent to action against Iran's nuclear facilities. Uncertain threats are often scarier that certain ones.
Even if the rockets have not been eliminated, they are not the threat that they once were, whose effects, being restricted to the imagination, loomed larger.
The final "overhang" of deterrence preventing action against Iran is the threat to close the Straight of Hormuz. Perhaps Iran will oblige us with a provocation, as Hizbullah so kindly did, and the Navy can clean house in the Gulf.
If the world economy survives the oil shock, as Israel has survived the rockets, then Iran's cards will have been substantially flipped.
And at that point, ironically, diplomacy may actually work in setting back Iran's nuclear program, as the threat of US and/or Israeli force will be that much more credible.
Considering your points
1. If Iran is not the center of gravity, let's make it so. Iran has no natural allies in the Sunni world. It is the only credible Islamic national state that is actively attempting to take on the US, but is doing so in a manner that allows it deniability. We could ignore that.
2. Lebanon has been a disaster for US policy so far. Agreed.
3. I am somewhat ambivalent about an Iranian nuclear device. Their having it may very well cause or scare enough caution into the opponents of the existing regime, but that may be wishful thinking on my part. The larger concern to me is the proliferation to other Islamic states and the present possession by pakistan. I concede this point to you.
4. Israel has made Hezbollah more important than it is. Hezbollah will more than likely become Lebanon.
Where does this take us? The Israeli attack on Lebanon has strengthened Hezbollah and has not caused the Lebanese to go after Hezbollah. IMO the exact thing would happen in Iran and we would likely strengthen the regime with an attack on the nuclear facilities. I believe the Iranians want an external attack by the US so that they can strengthen their hold on power in Iran. Would you consider a scenario that limits itself to a plan to decapitade the regime?
Aristides,
1) Yes and it's a complicated center of gravity because we have not really solve the Sunni's branch of fanatism yet before we're venturing into the Shite's branch of fanatism. Whether we are aware of these 2 fanatical branches of Islam before venturing in Iraq or not, the fact now the Shite's branch of fanatism have taken the lead implying a world of hurt in Iraq in the making for all parties of concern.
2) Only if you come to the table clean with no excess baggage. The US doesn't come to the table cleanly when a civil war is looming in Iraq and this event could be triggered anytime by Iran.
3) Yes and it has been said by Wretchard before, that pacifism is the art of delaying the cost to your children.
4) See number 3 above. Social disorder has no X-ray machine to diagnose, hence will be solved by maximum doses at the line of the margin. No but, no if.
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